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In The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
EDWARD E. V ALCARCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED BITTERS and his 




Case No. 9323 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff and Appellant in this action submits to 
the Court that during the first part of January, 1958, the 
Defendant, Reed Bitters, offered to sell to the Plaintiff, 
Edward E. Valcarce, for pelt prices, a number of live mink. 
The Defendant, Reed Bitters, had informed Plaintiff he 
would have to pelt out 700 or 800 females and' send the 
pelts to the company financing his operation in order to 
reduce his debt to that company; that there would be a 
saving to him in pelting and shipping costs if he were to 
instead sell the live mink to the Plaintiff and send the 
money received from the sale, rather than pelts, to the 
loaning institution. 
The Plaintiff agreed to this sale and accordingly gave 
a check for $1500 to the Defendant, Mr. Bitters. One 
hundred and· fifty female mink with SO males to cover 
had been delivered to the Plaintiff immediately prior to 
the time the check was handed to Mr. Bitters. 
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Sh.ortly-tliereafter, approximately the lOth of January, 
the Plaintiff delivered to Mr. Bitters a note for $2,700. 
There is a considerable conflict in the testimony at this 
point, the De fendant testifying that in consideration for 
this note, additional mink were to be delivered by Mr. 
Bitters to Mr. Valcarce; that Mr. Bitters would either lease 
Mr. Valcarce a number of mink on a fifty-fifty basis, or 
deliver a number of bred females (Tr. 7, 205, 208; PI) or 
return the note to Mr. Valcarce (Tr. 7) The Defendant 
testified (Tr 128) that there was no agreement for addi-
tional mink to be delivered as consideration. The testi-
mony of an independent witness, Mr. Christensen, was 
that Plaintiff and Defendant had made a "side agreement" 
with regard to the note ( Tr 40.) The trial judge also 
found there was a "side agreement" (Tr 207.) 
There was also some conflict as to the date the note 
and check were executed, the Defendant, Reed Bitters, 
testifying that the check and note were made out at the 
same time and in fact simultaneously ( Tr 80 and 81.) 
However, the date on the check and the date on the note 
(Ex 1 and 2) are different and there does not, therefore, 
seem to be any question but what the note was prepared 
on a day subsequent to the signing and delivery of the 
check. (Also Tr 124.) 
Considerable testimony was introduced at the trial 
to contradict Plaintiff's statement that the 150 females 
and 30 males which he purchased from the Defendants, 
and paid for, were actually worth no more than he paid 
for them by the check which is Exhibit 1. The Defendants 
introduced witnesses to testify that breeder mink com-
mand much higher prices than those Plaintiff claims he 
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paid. The Plaintiff has no quarrel whatsoever with this 
claim, or with the testimony of the witnesses produced 
on behalf of Defendants. He readily admits that breeder 
mink sells for considerably more than he claims he paid 
for Defendant's mink; his claim is that the Defendant, 
:\lr. Bitters, offered and did sell to him the mink for pelt 
prices for the reason that he had been required to pelt 
down a considerable number of breeder stock for the 
purpose of reducing a large indebtedness to the company 
financing his operation. 
It is important to note at this point that Plaintiff and 
Defendants were well acquainted and had been friends 
for many years; that they had had other business dealings, 
"both verbal and otherwise" ( Tr. 5.) The Plaintiff would, 
therefore, not have any reason to fear that another verbal 
agreement, that of a future delivery of mink, as consider-
ationa for a note which the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, re-
quested the Plaintiff to deliver to him as a favor and to 
help out in a difficult financial situation, would not be 
honored and fully complied with by the Defendants. 
The Plaintiff testified of several conversations with 
~Ir. Bitters in which Mr. Bitters stated they would be 
sure and get something worked out. 
When it appeared to the Plaintiff that the Defendant, 
~1r. Bitters, was not going to perform his promise and 
deliver the mink as consideration for the note, the Plain-
tiff demanded the note back. The Plaintiff testified that 
the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, told him he had misplaced 
the note, but until he could find it he would give the 
Plaintiff a statement stating he claimed no liens or encum-
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brances of any kind against Plaintiffs mink ·(Tr. 9), which 
the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, did on the 31st day of May, 
1958. (Pl. Exh. 2.) 
When the Defendants still failed to produce the note 
or any mink in consideration therefor, Plaintiff com-
menced legal action in the District Court to either require 
the Defendants to deliver a reasonable number of mink 
as consideration for the note or return the note to the 
Plaintiff. It is from a judgment dismissing the action that 
Plaintiff now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In support of this appeal Plaintiff contends: 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2, 
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. FINDING OF FACT NO. 1 AND FINDING OF 
FACT NO. 2 ARE NOT CONSISTENT. 
B. THE COURT HAVING RECOGNIZED THAT 
THERE WAS AN ORAL AGREEMENT AF-
FECTING THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
NOTE IN QUESTION HAD A DUTY TORE-
COGNIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT ORAL 
AGREEMENT AND RESOLVE THE EQUI-
TIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
C. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS AND THE COURT 
DOES NOT FIND TO THE CONTRARY 
THAT THE WRITTEN NOTE WAS NOT THE 
ENTIRE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
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AND THAT THE COURT WAS THEREFORE 
IN ERROR IN FAILING TO GIVE VALIDITY 
TO THE ADDITIONAL TERMS OF THE EN-
TIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PART-
IES, WHICH VERBAL AGREEMENT CON-
TEMPLATED THE GIVING OF ADDITI-
ONAL CONSIDERATION FOR THE NOTE 
IN QUESTION. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
EFFECT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT, MR. BITTERS, THAT HE DID NOT HAVE "ANY 
CLAIM, MORTGAGE, OR LIEN OF ANY KIND ON 
ANY 1\IINK" ON PLAINTIFF'S RANCH. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2, 
ITS CONCDLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT 
IN FA\?OR OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
A. FINDING OF FACT NO.1 AND FINDING OF 
FACT NO. 2 ARE NOT CONSISTENT. 
It should suffice to point out that in its Finding of 
Fact No. 1 the Court finds that the plaintiff paid for cer-
tain mink by check and promissory note, the Plaintiff 
receiving fair value for the execution and delivery of said 
note; and then in its Finding of Fact No. 2, finds that 
there were, in fact, other agreements or side-arrangements, 
but determining that it could not recognize or enforce 
them because of their indefiniteness. 
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- "it- ~is. difficult to -~n~-lerstancf how the Plaintiff could 
have been more definite in explaining the side agreement 
than his statement that the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, was 
to deliver some 60 bred females in March and when he 
did not do this, was to lease 400 or 500 females, with males, 
to cover, to the Plaintiff, on a fifty-fifty basis. In the 
event Mr. Bitter's loaning institution foreclosed against 
him, the Plaintiff would then pay for the note through 
the leasing agreement, and the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, 
would take the balance of his share due him under the 
ranching agreement with the Plaintiff in mink, and this 
would assure Mr. Bitters being able to stay in the mink 
ranching business. If the lending institution did not 
foreclose Mr. Bitters, the note was to be returned. (Tr. 
7, 8.) Mr. Bitters was not foreclosed, neither was the 
note returned nor the additional mink delivered. Mter 
the original agreement failed, the Plaintiff proposed other 
alternatives, which the Defendant, Mr. Bitters, promised 
to work out but did not. 
Such an agreement as that described would seem 
clear, and capable of interpretation and execution under 
the supervision of a court of equity. 
If for some reason the Defendants are not in a posi-
tion to complete their agreement, the legal principal which 
applies is that the Court, having taken jurisdiction, can 
award damages to assure that equity is had: 
"Under the rule that equity having assumed jur-
isdiction of a case may retain it to do full justice, it is 
proper for the court to ascertain and award the dam-
ages flowing from the wrong which is the basis of 
equitable relief." SO C. J. S. Equity, Sec. 72, Dam-
ages, P. 424 
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. "Where case is brought in equity~ and proved 
facts support allegations of complaint entitling plain-
tiff to equitable relief, court having obtained juris-
diction over cause will, in exercise of its equity juris-
diction, proceed to decide whole issues and award 
complete relief, although rights of parties may be 
strictly legal and damages will be awarded in sub-
stitution for or in addition to equitable relief." Was-
atch Oil Refining Co. vs. Wade, Judge, et al. 92 Utah 
50, 1936, ( 63 P. 2d 1070) 
The Plaintiff having proved, and the Court recog-
nized, there was a side agreement, the Plaintiff, it would 
seem, is entitled to equitable relief and if the Defendants 
because of a change in their circumstances, are unable to 
perform the side agreement, certainly the court, in equity, 
can and should award reasonable damages. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2, 
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT 
IN FA \ 70R OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
B. THE COURT HAVING RECOGNIZED THAT 
THERE WAS AN ORAL AGREEMENT AF-
FECTING THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
NOTE IN QUESTION HAD A DUTY TO RE-
COGNIZE THE SUBSTANCE OF THAT ORAL 
AGREE~1ENT AND RESOLVE THE EQUI-
TIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Though the fact situations do not apply to the case 
in question, two Utah cases have announced principles 
which are applicable. In the first: Jones Min. Co. vs. 
• 
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- - . 
Cardiff 1\Jin: & Mill Co. et al., 56 Utah 449, 1920, ( 191 
Pac. 426) the Justice writing the opinion states: 
"I unhesitatingly assert that a Court of equity 
should not permit a wrong doer to profit by his 
" wrong. 
And the Second: Hansen vs. Abraham I1T. Co. 82 
Utah 361. ( 1933) (2.5 P. 2d. 76) 
"Equity will look, not to the mere form or shadow 
of a transaction, but to the substance of it and to the 
real transaction had between the parties." 
Certainly, if there was a side agreement, as the Court 
recognizes there was, the defendants have been allowed 
to profit by their wrong by the failure of the Court to 
look at the substance of the real transaction and determine, 
in view of the failure of the defendants, the equities of 
the parties. 
As the case of Bowen vs. Hockley, 71 F. 2d. 781 
( 1934, Cited at 94 A L R 856) 
"One of the glories of equity jurisprudence is that it 
is not bound by the strict rules of the common law, 
but can mold its decrees to do justice amid all the 
vicissitudes and intricacies of life. The principles 
upon which it proceeds are eternal; but their applica-
tion in a changing world \vill necessarily change to 
meet changed situations. If relief had not been 
granted only where precedent could be found for it, 
this great system would never have been developed; 
and, if such a narrow view of equitable powers is 
adopted now, the result will be the return of the rigid 
and unyielding system which equity jurisprudence 
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was designed to remedy. As was well said by Prof. 
Pomery (Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) Sec. 60): 
... In fact, there is no limit to the various forms and 
kinds of specific remedy which he may grant, adopted 
to novel conditions of right and obligation, which are 
constant!~, arising from the n1ovements of society." 
and further, citing 19 Am. Jur. Equity, Sec 451, n. 3, P. 
311: 
"The fact that there is no wrong without a 
remedy has been the boast of many of the sages of 
the law from early times. Says Lord Coke (Co. Lit. 
197, b. 1 Thomas's Coke, 9020: "The law wills that, 
in every case where a man is wronged and en-
clanged, he shall have a remedy." And Lord Holt 
has said: "if the plaintiff has a right, he must of 
necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it. . 
It is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 1 AND 2, 
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND ITS JUDGMENT 
IN FA. VOR OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
C. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS AND THE COURT 
DOES NOT FIND TO THE CONTRARY, 
THAT THE WRITTEN NOTE WAS NOT THE 
ENTIRE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES AND 
THE COURT WAS THEREFORE IN ERROR IN 
FAILING TO GIVE VALIDITY TO THE ADDI-
TIONAL TER:\IS OF THE AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES, WHICH VERBAL 
AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATED THE GIVING 
OF ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
NOTE I~ QUESTION. 
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~- ~ -It js ,a well settled principle of the law that oral evi-
dence, as between the parties, can be introduced to show 
consideration, or want of consideration, for a note. 
"The fact that a note on its fact purports to be 
for value received does not preclude the defense of 
want of consideration." 
7 Am Jur, Bills and Notes, Sec. 249, P. 943 n. 9 ( 108 
P. 914, Mont.) 
"Parol or extrinsic evidence affecting bills and 
notes is governed by much the same rules as govern 
the admissibility of such evidence generally. Classi-
fied with reference to the extrinsic facts sought to be 
shown, the evidence may relate to oral agreements 
between the parties not embodied in the writing, or 
to facts and circumstances which surround the parties 
at the time of the contract, and by which it is sought 
to show their intention. The oral agreements sought 
to be shown may be prior or contemporaneous with 
the execution of the writing or they may be subse-
quent thereto ... and as between the original parties 
... parol evidence has always been admitted to show 
fraud, want or failure of consideration ... or to show 
that the writing is only a part of an entire oral con-
tract between the parties, or that its obligation has 
been fully discharged by an oral collateral agreement. 
So, in a controversy between the parties ... proof may 
be made of a collateral agreement which was the 
consideration for the instrument, or which postponed 
the legal operation of the writing until the happening 
of a contingency. Again, an instrument is to be 
constued. . . in the light of its subject matter and 
the circumstances in which and the purposes for 
which it was executed evidence of which is always 
admissible in the construction of written contracts, in 
order to put the Court in the position of the parties." 
(Emphasis added) 
8 Am Jur, Bills and Notes, Sec. 1049, P. 630 and 631 
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Although notes are presumed to have been issued 
for a valuable consideration to the maker, in action 
on notes where evidence is offered tending to over-
come this presumption, the burden of proof is again 
cast on the plaintiff. 
Finder vs. Morris ~Iiller & Co., 52 NE 2d. 1023 
(Ill.) 
"Where the payee of a note fails to furnish the 
promised main or chief consideration therefor, the 
defendant maker should be relieved from paying the 
note sued on." Pappas vs. Courembis 82 A 2d. 757. 
Since the evidence in this case shows the existence of 
such an oral contract, of which the note was merely a part, 
as would come within the principles set forth in the cases 
cited above and there is no contradiction in the evidence 
or findings of the Court that such oral contract, or side 
agreements were not performed by the defendants, the 
plaintiff submits that the note in question, if the equities 
thereof can not be adjusted by a Court of equity, fails for 
want of consideration, and cites in support thereof the 
Utah State Code Annotated, 1953, 
"44-1-29. Effect of Want of Consideration. -
"Absence or failure of consideration is matter of de-
fense as against any person not a holder in due course, 
and partial failure of consideration is a defense pro 
tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liqui-
dated amount or otherwise.n (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiff further cites in support of his proposition 
two cases which have been decided under this section: 
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· '·· ·. :-:j~ "· • - .~: Under·this··section, in action by payee on 
note, want or failure of consideration may be shown 
if presented by averments contained in answer, by 
showing any arrangement entered into between the 
parties that is not illegal or unreasonable. Smith vs. 
Brown, 50 U. 27, 165 P. 468, followed in Harris vs. 
Wilstead, 114 U. 496, 201 P. 2d 491. 
Considerable authority has been quoted to support 
the legal proposition that oral evidence may be introduced 
to show that a writing, such as the note in question, is 
only part of an entire agreement between parties, that 
such an agreement may contemplate the furnishing of 
consideration for the note, and if the agreement fails, the 
maker thereof should be relieved from paying the note 
sued on. 
The purpose of the lengthy quotations was not to 
suggest any failure on the part of the trial judge to admit 
testimony pertaining to any oral agreements connected 
with or pertinent to the note in question. The purpose 
was to point out that when such testimony has established 
as a fact that there was an oral agreement, and that the 
oral agreement failed, such fact should, and in fact, must, 
be considered by the Court in making it decision. 
That the trial judge in this case had a rather strong 
prejudice against oral agreements, appears from the state-
ments in his announced judgment: 
"I can't bring myself to enforce a speculative, inchoate 
contract where I can't figure out what the terms of 
it are. I find that there was some talk about a side 
contract, but for the life of me I can't find out what 
the terms of it were. So the plaintiff, having elected 
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to deal in secret arrangements, behind-door deals, 
will have to suffer the consequences I just can't take 
my needle and thread and weave a contract." 
While we may sympathize with the feelings of the 
judge just because he does not like "secret arrangements" 
and refuses to consider anything except what is in writing 
because of that dislike, a party who has been wronged, 
\vho has entered into an agreement with a payee of a note, 
and has watched that agreement fail in spite of numerous 
efforts to work out a compromise and a solution, should 
not be denied justice in a court of equity. 
"The most striking and distinctive feature of courts 
of equity is that they can adapt their decrees to all 
the varieties of circumstances which may arise and 
so adjust them to all the peculiar rights, mutual and 
adverse, of all the parties in interest." 
19 Am. Jur., Equity, Sec. 123, n. 17 
(Citing Higginbottom vs. Short, 25 Miss. 160, 
57 Am. Dec. 198) 
"The maxim that equity will not suffer a wrong to be 
without a remedy, is probably the most important 
of the principles which were addressed to the court 
or chancellor." 
19 Am. Jur. Equity, Sec. 451 
Though it would perhaps have been difficult for the 
trial judge to adjust the peculiar rights of the parties to 
this action, the court of equity, for that reason, cannot 
permit the Plaintiff to suffer for the wrong of the De-
fandants in failing to complete the oral agreement, but 
must apply the principles of equity to his decree and find 
a remedy. 
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··POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
EFFECT TO THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFEND-
ANT, MR. BITTERS, THAT HE DID NO HAVE "ANY 
CLAIM, MORTGAGE, OR LEIN OF ANY KIND ON 
ANY MINK" ON PLAINTIFF'S RANCH. 
There is no conflict in the evidence that the consider-
ation for the note in question was mink, that the note was 
given as payment for mink. Neither is there any conflict, 
as has been stated before, that there were side agreements 
contemplated in connection with payment for the note. 
In view of these uncontroverted facts, Plaintiff submits 
that the legal effect of the statement made by the de-
fendant Mr. Bitters, that he did not have any claim mort-
gage, or lien of any kind on any mink on the plaintiff's 
ranch is an admission on Mr. Bitters part that the note 
was actually paid. 
Mr. Bitters' statement on cross examination would 
seem to confirm this: ( Tr. 152) 
"Q. I'm asking you, if the note said, if the note 
stated, "I do not have any mortgage or any lien on any 
mink on Ed Valcarce's ranch," then that would mean 
he didn't owe you for the note, because the note you 
have testified to - (was for the balance of the mink, 
as you have claimed) 
"A. I don't understand it. I think that's probably 
true." 
The testimony of the Defendant, Mrs. Bitters, suggest 
the same: (Tr. 188) 
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"Q. But you still didn't want him to sign the state-
ment? 
"A. N 0. 
"Q. Because if he signed it he couldn't ranch mink? 
"A. I was a little inclined to think that this statement 
would have some bearing on the note that Mr. Val-
carce had signed with us, and its collection. That 
was the main reason." 
The Defendant, Reed Bitters, while denying that he 
ever agreed to ranch mink with Mr. Valcarce as consider-
ation for the note in question, testified that if he had a 
good year, he would lease the Plaintiff some mink. The 
Court determined, that in view of the testimony of Mr. 
Christensen, referred to above, whether or not Mr. Bitters 
had a good year was significant. The trial was therefore 
continued to a later date at which time testimony on this 
point could be taken. After considerable discussion on 
this point, Mr. Bitters agreed that he had had a good year 
so far as the production of a kit crop was concerned, and 
that the statement would be the determining factor 
(Tr. 175). 
~Ir. Bitters' position then became that so long 
as Mr. Valcarce held a paper stating that he, Mr. 
Bitters, did not have any claim, mortgage, or lien of any 
kind on any n1ink on Plaintiff's ranch, he couldn't ranch 
any mink with the Plaintiff ( Tr. 151, 158). However, the 
evidence is clear that ~1r. Valcarce needed the statement 
for a particular purpose, that of obtaining financing for 
his operation (Tr. 62) and that the circumstance referred 
to a particular date ( Tr. 200). Logic would prove that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
once "financmg was obtained, and the loaning· agency had 
its usual mink count, there would be no further restrictions 
upon any arrangements for moving in additional mink 
which the grower wanted to make. The Defendant, Reed 
Bitters testified there would be no restriction as he at-
tempted to impose at the trial, as evidenced· by his own 
testimony: (Tr, 198) 
"Q. Now, Mr. Bitters, at one time -I don't remem-
ber which day of trial it was - but you have testified, 
have you not, that mink can still be ranched on an-
other farm,. even. though the mink owned by that 
ranch are mortgaged, is that correct? 
"A y , 
. es. 
In v;iew of the testimony referred to, it would seem 
clear that Mr. Bitters intended, by signing a statement 
that he did not have any claim, mortgage, or lien of any 
kind on any mink on Plaintiff's ranch, to absolve Mr. 
Valcarce of any obligation on the note he had signed. 
It would further seem clear that Mr. Bitters' con-
tention he could not ranch mink with Mr. Valcarce be-
cause of the statement is not valid, but was a stratagem 
invented to meet an exigency created by the serious fin-
ancial difficulty in which Mr. Bitters found himself and 
which he had sought to alleviate by wrongfully pledging 
a note without consideration, a note which he had no 
right to claim unless and until he complied with his many 
promises to work out the consideration with the maker 
thereof. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellant respectfully requests that the 
Court reverse the decision of the Honorable Lewis Jones 
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dismissing the complaint filed by appellant in the district 
court, which complaint was filed by appellant for the pur-
pose of enforcing an oral agreement between the parties 
whereby respondent was to deliver additional mink as 
consideration for the promissory note in question, the trial 
court having found there was such an oral agreement but 
denying relief on the grounds of an alleged indefiniteness 
of the terms of the "side agreement," when in fact those 
tenns were clear and capable of interpretation by a court 
of equity; and further denying relief on the basis of a 
personal dislike for any part of an agreement not in writ-
ing, a dislike for "secret arrangements and behind-door 
deals," all of which statements and decision are contrary 
to the principles and powers of equity jurisprudence, and 
for the further reason that the evidence shows that the 
Defendant, Mr. Bitters signed a statement that he did not 
have any claim, mortgage or lien on any mink on 
Plaintiff's ranch, which statement was in effect, and was 
intended to be an admission on the part of the Defendant 
that the note in question had been paid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHERMA HANSEN, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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